United States v. United States District Court (Kantor): Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation Or Protecting the Pornography Producer? by Pretzer, Janelle E.
McGeorge Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 4 Article 11 
1-1-1989 
United States v. United States District Court (Kantor): Protecting 
Children from Sexual Exploitation Or Protecting the Pornography 
Producer? 
Janelle E. Pretzer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Janelle E. Pretzer, United States v. United States District Court (Kantor): Protecting Children from Sexual 
Exploitation Or Protecting the Pornography Producer?, 20 PAC. L. J. 1343 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol20/iss4/11 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu. 
United States v. United States District
Court (Kantor): Protecting Children
From Sexual Exploitation or Protecting
the Pornography Producer?
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
which abridges the freedom of speech or press.' The United States
Supreme Court, in New York v. Ferber,2 held that child pornography
is outside first amendment protection.3 However, in restricting child
pornography, the state must not infringe upon constitutionally pro-
tected speech.4 In Smith v. California5 the United States Supreme
Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the sale of obscene books
(material outside first amendment protection) must require some
degree of scienter to ensure that distribution of constitutionally
protected material is not restricted.6 In Ferber, the Court, in uphold-
ing a statute prohibiting the promotion of child pornography, stated
that the state has a great interest in protecting children from sexual
exploitation, and the legitimate reach of the statute far outweighs
the possible restriction of constitutionally protected speech. 7 However,
the statute in Ferber expressly required scienter: knowledge of the
contents of the material.8 The United States Supreme Court has never
1. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
2. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
3. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
4. See infra notes 19-36 and accompanying text (discussing the first amendment overbreadth
doctrine).
5. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
6. Smith, 361 U.S. at 154-55.
7. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (stating that the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-bing of a minor is compelling); id. at 773 (stating that the
legitimate reach of the statute dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications).
8. Id. at 752.
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decided a case in which a child pornography statute being challenged
as unconstitutionally overbroad has not required scienter. 9
The Ninth Circuit has considered such a case in United States v.
United States District Court (Kantor).10 In Kantor, Ronald Kantor
and Rupert McNee, pornography producers, depicted sixteen-year-
old Traci Lords in Those Young Girls." Kantor and McNee were
charged with violating section 2251(a) of the Child Protection Act,
which prohibits the production of materials depicting a minor engaged
in sexually explicit conduct.12 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Kantor and McNee must be allowed to present a reasonable
mistake of age defense under the first amendment free speech clause. 3
The government argued that section 2251(a) did not require scienter
or provide a reasonable mistake of age defense. 14 The court, however,
held that a reasonable mistake of age defense was required to save
section 2251(a) from unconstitutionally infringing on protected
speech.5
Part I of this note sets forth the legal background of the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine, the prior judicial decisions regard-
ing the application of the overbreadth doctrine to criminal statutes
prohibiting pornography, and the statutes protecting children from
sexual exploitation.16 Part II summarizes the facts and opinion of
the Kantor decision. 7 Finally, part III sets forth the legal ramifica-
tions of the Kantor decision. 8
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment and The Overbreadth Doctrine
The first amendment provides that Congress shall not make any
law which abridges the freedom of speech or press. 9 Restraints on
9. See United States v. United States Dist. Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that the claim that the first amendment requires that the government prove scienter
as to age in its prima fade case, or that the defendants be permitted to prove a reasonable mistake
of age defense, in a prosecution under section 2251(a) is a novel issue).
10. 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Id. at 536.
12. Id. at 535.
13. Id. at 542-43.
14. Id. at 536.
15. Id. at 542.
16. See infra notes 19-127 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 128-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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free expression, however, have been permitted in the case of child
pornography. 20 In New York v. Ferber, the United States Supreme
Court held that child pornography is outside the protection of the
first amendment.21 The Court found that the production and distri-
bution of child pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children, and that the state, under the state police power,
has a compelling interest in preventing the sexual abuse of children
resulting from child pornography. 22 In restricting child pornography,
however, the state must not unduly infringe upon constitutionally
protected speech. 23
Traditionally, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally
apply may not challenge the statute as unconstitutional when applied
to others not before the court.24 The first amendment overbreadth
doctrine, however, allows a defendant, whose own speech may con-
stitutionally be prohibited, to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally
overbroad on its face? The overbreadth doctrine is predicated on
the importance of safeguarding protected speech; the United States
Supreme Court was concerned that persons may refrain from exer-
cising constitutionally protected expression because of fear of criminal
sanctions by a statute potentially applicable to the constitutionally
protected speech.26
Based on the purpose and nature of the overbreadth doctrine, the
Court has determined that a statute should be invalidated only if the
20. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). See infra notes 54-95 and accompanying
text (discussing the Ferber decision).
21. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
22. Id. at 756-57.
23. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
25. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). See also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769
(stating that the United States Supreme Court has allowed a person to attack overly broad statutes
even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected and could be
proscribed by a law drawn with the requisite specificity in order to protect from infringement the
constitutionally protected rights of those not before the court); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
521 (1972) (stating that the value of constitutionally protected expression justifies allowing a person
to attack an overly broad statute with no requirement that the person demonstrate his own conduct
could not be regulated by the statute); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating
that attacks on overly broad statutes have been allowed with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
requisite narrow specificity); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (stating that where
constitutional rights of one not before the court would be impaired, and he has no effective way
to preserve his rights, the court may consider those rights as before it).
26. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)
(stating that, in the area of the first amendment, one whose conduct may validly be prohibited
may challenge the statute as it applies to others because protected speech may be inhibited by the
overly broad reach of the statute); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521 (stating that persons whose expression
is constitutionally protected may refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions
provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected speech).
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statute is "substantially" overbroad. 27 The substantial overbreadth
doctrine requires a court to find a realistic danger that the statute
will significantly compromise the exercise of constitutionally protected
speech in a substantial number of instances.2 The number of instances
the statute would infringe on constitutionally protected speech may
then be balanced against the governmental interests involved. 29 While
a sweeping statute has the potential to chill the exercise of protected
speech by many individuals, the chilling effect of the statute decreases
with the declining reach of the statute.'0 There comes a point at
which the chilling effect does not justify invalidating a statute on its
face and prohibiting a state from enforcing a statute against conduct
that is within the power of the state to proscribe.3 1
When a statute is found to be substantially overbroad, the court
may either strike down the statute entirely or provide a limiting
construction narrowing the statute.32 When a statute is struck down,
it may not be applied to anyone until the legislature amends it to
correct the impermissible overbreadth. 3  Therefore, courts strike down
statutes sparingly and only as a last resort.34 In contrast, a limiting
construction allows application of a statute without any additional
legislative action. 35 In giving an overly broad statute a limiting
construction, a court will not pervert the purpose of, or judicially
rewrite, a statute.36
27. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988);
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
28. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. See also City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).
29. Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating the
challenged statute) with Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding the challenged
ordinance).
30. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982). See also Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrie, 83 HAv. L. R-v. 844, 859 n.61 (1970) (stating that a presumption exists
that only substantially overbroad regulations produce the chill on constitutionally protected speech
that i. judicially cognizable and that the substantial overbreadth requirement is necessary to prevent
overbreadth review from being draconian, since most laws could be unconstitutional in some
conceivable application).
31. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
32. Id. at 613.
33. Id. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (stating that an overly broad
ordinance may not be applied to anyone until a limiting construction is placed on the ordinance).
34. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
35. Id. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (stating that the state must
obtain a narrowing construction in a non-criminal proceeding before it can prosecute under the
statute in the future); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (limiting and defining
the authority granted to a licensing board under a state statute in order to save the statute from
invalidity).
36. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986).
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B. Case Law
Two United States Supreme Court cases have dealt with the ap-
plication of the overbreadth doctrine to criminal statutes prohibiting
pornography.37 In Smith v. California, the Court found an ordinance
prohibiting the sale of obscene books to be unconstitutionally over-
broad because the ordinance lacked a scienter requirement. 38 The
Court stated that without a scienter requirement, the ordinance
restricted the distribution of constitutionally protected material.3 9 In
Ferber, however, the Court found a statute prohibiting the promotion
of child pornography when the defendant knew the character and
content of the material not to be overbroad and therefore constitu-
tional.40 The statute in Ferber was upheld based on a compelling
state interest in protecting children from the physical and emotional
dangers of participating in child pornography. 41 Therefore, the legit-
imate reach of the statute far outweighed the arguably impernissible
applications of the statute to the production of educational, medical,
or artistic works. 42
1. Smith v. California
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court struck down a city
ordinance as a violation of the first amendment's overbreadth doc-
trine.43 The Court held that a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of
obscene books without requiring scienter unconstitutionally inhibited
the distribution of constitutionally protected speech. 44 The city ordi-
nance in Smith made it unlawful for a person to possess any obscene
book in a place of business where books were sold.45 The ordinance
37. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
38. Smith, 361 U.S. at 154-55.
39. Id.
40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773-74.
41. Id. at 756-57.
42. Id. at 756-57, 773.
43. Smith, 361 U.S. at 155.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 148. The case cites section 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los
Angeles, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession any obscee or indecent
writing, book.. .or transcription of any kind in any of the following places:
1347
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did not require scienter: knowledge by the accused of the contents
of the book.4 The defendant, a bookstore owner, was charged with
violating the ordinance by having an obscene book in his bookstore.
47
The defendant contended that the strict liability ordinance violated
the first amendment because it inhibited the distribution of consti-
tutionally protected material as well as material not protected by the
constitution. 48 In response, the state argued that requiring a scienter
element would make the regulation of the distribution of obscene
material ineffective, since booksellers would simply deny knowledge
of the contents of their books.49 In applying the overbreadth doctrine
to the ordinance, the Court found the ordinance inhibited protected
speech by not requiring scienter on the part of the bookseller. 0 The
Court noted that a state may regulate obscene material, but the state
has no power to restrict the dissemination of books that are not
obscene.5' The Court found that if a bookseller is subject to criminal
liability for possessing obscene material in a bookstore without
knowledge of the contents of the book, the bookseller will restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected to avoid any possible
criminal liability.5 2 In effect, the state would be restricting the dis-
tribution of constitutionally protected as well as nonprotected ma-
terial.5 3 The Court concluded that the restriction imposed by the state
on constitutionally protected material unconstitutionally inhibited
protected speech.5
4
2. New York v. Ferber
In contrast to Smith, the United States Supreme Court in Ferber
upheld a New York child pornography statute, finding that it did
not violate the first amendment overbreadth doctrine.55 The statute
2. In any place of business where ice-cream, soft drinks, candy, food, school supplies,
magazines, books, pamphletes, papers, pictures or postcards are sold or kept for
sale....
Id. at 148 n.1 (quoting section 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles).
46. Id. at 149.
47. Id. at 148-49.
48. Id. at 149.
49. Id. at 154.
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id. at 152.
52. Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 153-54.
54. Id. at 155.
55. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74.
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prohibited a person from producing, directing, or promoting any
performance which included sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age.56 The statute did not require proof that the
performance was obscene, but did require that the defendant know
the character and content of the performance.5 7
The defendant, Paul Ferber, a bookstore owner, sold to an un-
dercover police officer two films depicting young boys masturbating.
5 8
The defendant was prosecuted for promoting a performance that
included sexual conduct by a child under sixteen years of age in
violation of the statute.5 9 The defendant contended that the statute
violated the first amendment because the statute did not require that
the material be obscene 0 The defendant further contended that the
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibited the
distribution of material with serious literary, scientific, or educational
value.61
a. Child Pornography Not Protected Speech
In deciding whether the New York statute was unconstitutional
because it did not require that the material be obscene, the Court
discussed whether a statute, designed to prevent the abuse of children,
could prohibit dissemination of material depicting children engaged
in sexual conduct, regardless of whether the material was obscene,
without violating the first amendment. 62 The Court noted that states
could regulate speech not protected by the first amendment as long
as protected speech was not inhibited.63 In balancing the interest of
56. Id. at 751. The case cites sections 263.15 and 263.00(5) of the New York Penal Law,
which provides:
A person is guilty of [a class D felony] when, knowing the character and content
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which indudes sexual conduct
by a child less than sixteen years of age.
Promote means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver,
transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or adver-
tise, or to offer or agree to do the same.
Id.
57. Id. at 752.
58. Id. at 751-52.
59. Id. at 752.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 766.
62. Id. at 753-65.
63. Id. at 754, 755-56. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (finding that a statute
must sufficiently defime the prohibited conduct and devise substantive limits on what fell within
1349
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the state in protecting children from sexual exploitation against the
possibility of chilling protected speech, the Court set forth five
reasons the first amendment does not protect child pornography.
4
First, the Court reasoned that the state has a compelling interest
in safeguarding the physical and emotional well-being of minors
within the state.6 5 The Court noted that legislation aimed at protecting
the physical and emotional well-being of the youth has been upheld
even when the laws have interfered with constitutionally protected
rightsA6 The legislative findings that accompanied the New York
statute set forth the concern of the state for the protection of children
exploited as subjects in sexual performances.6 7 The Court concluded
that it would not second-guess the legislative judgment.68
Second, the Court found that the distribution of photos and films
depicting a child's sexual activity intrinsically relates to the sexual
abuse of children in two ways. 69 The Court stated that the materials
produced are a permanent record of the child's participation in the
the unprotected speech classification in order to deal with the danger of suppressing protected
speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not constitu-
tionally protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (finding
that there are some classes of speech, including the lewd and obscene, which are not protected by
the first amendment).
64. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756, 764.
65. Id. at 756-57. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)
(stating that safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling
state interest).
66. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. The Court further noted that the legislative judgment is that
the use of children in pornographic material is harmful to the emotional and mental health of the
child. Id. at 758. See also S. RP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CoDa CONG. & ADmN. NEws 40, 43 (stating that the use of children in pornography is very
harmful to the children and to society as a whole); Schoettle, Child Exploitations: A Study of
Child Pornography, 19 J. Am. AcED. Cmw PsYcmATRY 289, 296 (1980) (stating that sexually
exploited children are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual
dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults). See generally FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (holding that the interest of the government in the
well-being of youth justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by adults as well
as children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (holding that a statute protecting
children from exposure to nonobscene literature was valid); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 170 (1944) (holding that a statute prohibiting the use of a child to distribute literature was
valid notwithstanding the effect of the statute on acts protected by the first amendment).
67. See 1977 N.Y. Law, ch. 910, § 1 (stating that the care of children is a sacred trust and
should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the
exploitation of children, and that the public policy of the state demands the protection of children
from exploitation through sexual performances).
68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. The Court would not second-guess the legislative judgment since
virtually all of the states and the United States have passed legislation proscnbing the production
of child pornography and since the judgment found in research literature on the effects of sexual
exploitation on children, is that the use of children as pornography subjects is harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. Id.
69. Id. at 759.
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sexual performance, and the circulation of the material exacerbates
the harm to the child.70 In addition, the Court stated that the
successful distribution network of child pornography is required to
be visible while the production of child pornography is a low-profile
industry.71 The only practical method of controlling sexual abuse of
children used in child pornography is to stop the distribution network
by imposing criminal penalties on persons involved in the distribution
of child pornography. 72
Third, the Court found that the promotion and distribution of
child pornography provides an economic motive for the production
of child pornography. 73 The Court concluded that the promotion and
distribution of child pornography is an integral part of the production
of child pornography, which is illegal throughout the nation.74 The
Court stated that first amendment protection does not extend to
speech used as an integral part of conduct that violates a valid
criminal statute. 75 Since the production of child pornography is illegal,
and promotion and distribution of child pornography is an integral
part of production, the court reasoned that the first amendment
protection should not extend to the promotion and distribution of
child pornography. 76
Fourth, the Court found the value of materials depicting children
engaged in sexual conduct to be very modest, if not de minimis.
77
70. Id. See also id. at 759 n.10 (citing Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of
Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE Fonast L. Rnv. 535, 545 (1981) (stating that pornography
poses an even greater threat to a child than does sexual abuse or prostitution because the child's
actions are reduced to a recording, which haunts the child forever); Schoettle, supra note 66, at
292 (stating that fear of exposure and teasion of keeping the act a secret have profound emotional
repercussions on the child victim); Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 301 (1979) (stating that
the victim's knowledge of publication of the material increases the emotional and psychic harm
suffered by the child)).
71. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
72. Id. at 759-60. See id. at 760 (stating that the production of child pornography is low-
profile while the distribution of child pornography requires visibility to succeed, so the most
practical law enforcement would be to dry-up the distribution network).
73. Id. at 761.
74. Id. at 761-62. See generally id. at 761 n.13 (Texas House Select Committee on Child
Pornography stating that the act of selling child pornography guarantees that there will be
additional abuse of children). The Court indicated that when conduct violates a valid criminal
statute, the speech used as an integral part of the conduct is not protected by the first amendment.
Id. at 762.
75. Id. at 761-62. See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (holding that any first amendment interest in advertising a
commercial activity is absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501 (1949) (holding that labor unions could be prohibited from
picketing a firm in support of a secondary boycott, which was validly outlawed).
76. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
77. Id. at 762.
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The Court stated that visual depictions of children engaging in sexual
conduct seldom constitute an important and necessary part of a
literary, scientific, or educational work.78 If it becomes necessary for
literary or artistic value, the Court noted that a youthful-looking
person who is over the statutory age could be utilized.
7 9
Finally, the Court concluded that recognizing child pornography
as outside first amendment protection is not incompatible with earlier
court decisions.8 0 The Court stated that it is not unusual for a
content-based classification of speech to be found outside first amend-
ment protection when the evil to be restricted overwhelmingly out-
weighs the expressive interests. 81 The Court concluded that when a
class of material bears so heavily on the welfare of children engaged
in the production of the material, the balance of interests is clearly
struck in favor of the state to protect the children. 2 Therefore, the
Court concluded that a state can prohibit dissemination of material
depicting children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether
the material is obscene, without violating the first amendment.8 3
The Court recognized, however, that the power of the state to
regulate child pornography is subject to limitations.84 First, the statute
must adequately define the conduct.8 5 The Court stated that the
nature of the harm to be combated, specifically, physical and emo-
tional harm of children, requires that the prohibition be limited to
works which visually depict children in sexual conduct.8 6 The Court
found that the New York statute sufficiently listed the forbidden acts
and limited the forbidden acts to works visually depicting the children
in sexual conduct.8 7 Second, the Court stated that as with laws
prohibiting obscenity, there must be some element of scienter on the
78. Id. at 762-63.
79. Id. at 763.
80. Id at 763. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
(stating that whether speech is or is not protected by the first amendment often depends on the
content of the speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (stating that a libelous
publication is not protected by the first amendment, leaving aside the special considerations when
a public official is the target).
81. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.





87. Id. at 765. Section 263.00(4) of the New York Penal Law defines a performance as only
including live or visual depictions: "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance.. .[or] other
visual representation exhibited before an audience." N.Y. Penal Law § 263.00(4) (McKinney 1980).
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part of the defendant. 8 The Court found that the statute in Ferber,
which required the defendant to have known the character and
content of the performance, expressly included a scienter require-
ment. 89
b. Overbreadth Doctrine
The Court then considered whether the New York statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad as potentially discouraging the distri-
bution of material with serious literary, scientific, or educational
value, or material not threatening the harms sought to be combated
by the state.90 The Court stated that a statute prohibiting the harmful
employment of children to make sexually explicit materials for dis-
tribution must be substantially overbroad before the Court will
invalidate it. 91 Applying the substantial overbreadth doctrine, the
Court recognized that the distribution of child pornography may
have the effect of chilling the production of protected expression,
such as medical textbooks and national geographic pictures. 92 The
Court recognized that the number of times it would be necessary to
employ children to engage in sexual conduct to produce educational,
medical, or artistic works is unknown. 93 However, the Court doubted
whether the number of times it would be necessary to employ children
for the production of educational, medical, or artistic work would
amount to more than a very small fraction of the materials within
the reach of the statute.94 Therefore, the Court held that the legitimate
reach of the statute vastly outweighed the arguably impermissible
applications of the statute.95 The Court concluded that the statute
was not substantially overbroad, and that whatever overbreadth may
88. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (stating that
it is constitutionally sufficient in an obscenity conviction that a defendant had knowledge of the
contents of the material, and that the defendant knew the character and nature of the materials);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that the city ordinance, prohibiting bookstore
owners from selling obscene books, could not constitutionally eliminate altogether a scienter
requirement).
89. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. The New York ordinance required that the accused know the
character and content of the material. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
90. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
91. Id. at 771.
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exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situa-
tions to which the statute, assertedly, may not be applied.
96
C. Federal Statutory Law
1. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
In 1977, Congress adopted the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act (PCASEA).97 Section 2251 (a) of the PCASEA
prohibits any person from employing, enticing, or coercing a minor
to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
visual or print medium shipped in interstate commerce. 9 Section
2252(a) of the PCASEA further makes it a federal crime knowingly
to ship in interstate commerce, for the purpose of sale, any obscene
visual or print medium depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. 99 Congress intentionally did not require that the defendant,
prosecuted under PCASEA section 2251(a), know the actor was a
minor.00 Congress originally considered bills requiring the defendant
knowingly to have employed a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing or promoting visual or print
medium. 10' However, the House of Representatives struck knowingly
from the bill to avoid an inference that a producer must know the
age of the minor before the producer can be prosecuted. 02 The
96. Id. at 773-74 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16).
97. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2255, 2423 (Vest 1978).
98. Id. § 2251(a). Minor was defined as a person under 16 years of age. Id. § 2253(1).
Sexually explicit conduct was defined as actual or simulated: (1) Sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sado-masochistic abuse (for the purpose of sexual
stimulation); and (5) lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Id. § 2253(2).
Producing was defined as producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing or advertising
for pecuniary profit. Id. § 2253(3). Visual or print medium was defined as any film, photograph,
negative, slide, book, magazine or other visual or print medium. Id. § 2253(4).
99. Id. § 2252(a). The test for obscene material is: (1) Whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973).
100. See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AmixN. NEws 40, 64.
101. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADnmN. NEws 40, 64. In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, an Assistant Attorney
General urged deletion of knowingly to avoid an inference that producers must know the minor's
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Senate Conference Committee accepted the version of the bill ad-
vanced by the House of Representatives intending that the defendant
not be required to know the age of the minor. 103
The PCASEA was, for the most part, ineffective. 104 In fact, only
four indictments under section 2251(a) and twenty-eight indictments
under section 2252 from May, 1977 to November, 1983 demonstrates
its ineffectiveness.10 5 Several factors account for the ineffectiveness
of PCASEA.' 6
First, the PCASEA required the minor to be under sixteen years
of age. 07 In many instances, the prosecution cannot establish the age
of a child because child pornography often uses a runaway child
who is impossible to identify or locate. 05 When the age of the child
cannot be proven through the testimony of the child, the age of the
child can be proven through the testimony of an expert who has
examined the photographs and has identified the age of the child.' °9
The effectiveness of the expert's identification of the child's age,
however, depends on the clarity, angle, and lighting of the photo-
graph." 10 Given the prosecution's burden of proving the age of the
minor beyond a reasonable doubt, use of expert testimony was
ineffective in prosecuting defendants for sexually exploiting fourteen
or fifteen-year-olds.Y"I
age before they can be prosecuted. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22
(1977) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney). The House of Repre-
sentatives, expressly adopting this view, struck knowingly from the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 696,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1977) (citing United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 172 (3d Cir.
1972) (holding that a federal statute prohibiting transportation of a minor in interstate commerce
for the purpose of engaging in immoral practices does not require knowledge of minor's age),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972)).
103. S. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEws 40, 42.
104. Note, Child Protection Act of 1984 Enforceable Legislation To Prevent Sexual Abuse of
Children, 10 OKLA. Crr U.L. Rev. 121, 128 (1985).
105. Id. at 128-29. See also H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnmN. NEvs 492, 493 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
106. See Note, supra note 104, at 128-29, 134-39.
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2253(1) (West 1978).
108. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADnN. NEws 492, 505 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice). See Note, supra note 104, at 134.
109. Note, supra note 104, at 135. The expert, preferably a pediatric endocrinologist, examines
the photographs and identifies the child's age based on five distinct states of adolescent pubertal
development. Id.
110. Id.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 492, 505 (stating that raising the age of a minor to eighteen makes it
"easier to prosecute cases in which fourteen or fifteen-year-olds have been sexually exploited, but
regarding whom actual proof of age is not available").
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Second, section 2251(a) required that the production of the child
pornography be for pecuniary gain and section 2252(a) required the
shipping of the child pornography be for the purpose of sale.12 Since
much of child pornography is noncommercial, many people who
produce or ship sexually exploitive material featuring children are
not subject to criminal sanction. 1 3 Continued sexual exploitation of
children was the result of producers and distributors of noncommer-
cial child pornography not being subject to criminal sanction."
4
Finally, unlike section 2251(a), section 2252(a) of the PCASEA
required the visual or print medium to be obscene." 5 This obscenity
requirement required the prosecution to prove that the material
satisfied the three-prong test set forth in Miller v. California.1 6 The
prosecution was presented with the problem of proving that the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests."
7
The child pornographer could include the sexually explicit photos of
a minor in a larger and unrelated context, making the material as a
whole unappealing to a prurient interest."
8
2. Child Protection Act
In apparent response to the ineffectiveness of the PCASEA and
the United States Supreme Court decision in Ferber, Congress amended
the PCASEA by adopting the Child Protection Act of 1984 (CPA). 119
112. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a), 2253(3) (Vest 1978).
113. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., at 17 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmaN. NEws 492, 508 (stating that the bulk of child pornography traffic is non-
commercial); ATrORNEY GRWs Coxmn.loN oN PoRNooAIHY, FiNAL REPORT, 410 (1986)
(stating that the bulk of child pornography is produced largely in cottage industry fashion-
produced at home for personal and trading use-while very little of child pornography is produced
for commercial use). See Note, supra note 104, at 136 (stating that eliminating the pecuniary gain
requirement will enable the statute to apply to those who produce child pornography for their
own pleasure).
114. See Note, supra note 104, at 136.
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a) (%Vest 1978).
116. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, (1973). See Note, supra note 104, at 139; supra note
99 and accompanying text (setting forth the three-prong test for obscenity).
117. See Note, supra note 104, at 140.
118. Id.
119. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2256, 2516 (Vest 1984 & Supp. 1988). Sections 2251, 2252 and
2256, as amended in 1984, are reproduced in this footnote. The bracketed portions were deleted
by the 1984 amendment and the italicized portions were added.
Section 2251 provides:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor
to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually
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The CPA raises the age of a minor from sixteen to eighteen.1 20
Raising the age requirement from sixteen to eighteen makes it easier
to prosecute the many cases in which fourteen or fifteen-year-olds
have been sexually exploited, but proof of their age was not availa-
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any [visual or print medium depicting]
visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (c), if
such person knows or has reason to know that such [visual or print medium] visual
depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed...
[(c)](d) Any [person] individual who violates this section shall be fined not more than
[$10,000,] $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such
[person] individual has a prior conviction under this section, such [person] individual
shall be fined not more than [$15,000,] $200,000, or imprisoned not less than two years
nor more than 15 years, or both.
Id. § 2251. Section 2252 provides:
(a) Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, [for the
purpose of sale or distribution for sale] any [obscene visual or print medium] visual
depiction, if -
(A) the producing of such [visual or print medium] visual depiction involves the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such [visual or print medium depicts] visual depiction is of such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives, [for the purpose of sale or distributes for sale, or knowingly
sells or distribution for sale] or distributes any [obscene visual or print medium] visual
depiction that has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or
mailed or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or
foreign commerce or through the mails, if
(A) the producing of such [visual or print medium] visual depiction involves the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such [visual or print medium depicts] visual depiction is of such conduct, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Any [person] individual who violates this section shall be fined not more than
[$10,000], $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but if such [person]
individual has a prior conviction under this section, such [person] individual shall be
fined not more than [$15,000,] $200,000, or imprisoned not less than two years or more
than 15 years, or both. Any organization which violates this section shall be fined not
more than $250,000.
Id. § 2251. Section 2256 provides:
For the purposes of this chapter, the term;
(1) "Minor" means any person under the age of [sixteen] eighteen years,
(2) "sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated -
A. Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
B. bestiality;
C. masturbation;
D. [sado-masochistic] sadistic or masochistic abuse [(for the purpose of sexual stimu-
lation)];
E. [lewd] lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person;
(3) "producing" means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing or
advertising [for pecuniary profit];
[(4) "visual or print medium" means any film, photograph, negative, slide, book,
magazine or other visual or print medium.]
(4) "organization" means a person other than an individual;
(5) "visual depiction" includes undeveloped film & videotape.
Id. § 2256.
120. Id. § 2255(1).
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ble.12 1 Second, the CPA deletes the requirement that the production
or shipment of child pornography be for pecuniary profit.'22 Deletion
of the requirement that the child pornography be for pecuniary profit
allows for the prosecution of the many people who produce or ship
sexually exploitive material featuring children for noncommercial
purposes. 2  Third, in response to the Ferber decision, the CPA
replaces "visual or print medium" with "visual depiction" and
deletes the obscenity requirement under section 2252(a) of the
PCASEA.'2 After Ferber, a written depiction of minors engaging in
nonobscene sexually explicit conduct remains protected by the first
amendment. 25 Therefore, "visual depiction" must replace "visual or
print medium" to avoid the statute's being declared unconstitutionally
overbroad.' 26 In addition, after Ferber, child pornography was outside
first amendment protection regardless of whether the material was
obscene.127 Therefore, the CPA deletes the obscenity requirement of
section 2252(a).'2
II. THE CASE
In Kantor, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the ar-
gument that the first amendment requires a reasonable mistake of
age defense when a defendant is criminally charged with producing
materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct
prohibited by section 2251(a) of the Child Protection Act. 129 The
court held that the first amendment does not permit the imposition
of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability if to do so would
seriously chill protected speech. 3 0 The court narrowed the defense to
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that a criminal defen-
dant did not know, and could not reasonably have learned, that the
child actor or actress was under 18 years of age.'
121. Note, supra note 104, at 136.
122. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252(a), 2256(3) (vest 1984 & Supp. 1988).
123. Note, supra note 104, at 136. See generally supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text
(stating that under the PCASEA producers of noncommercial child pornography were not subject
to criminal sanction).
124. See Note, supra note 104, at 136-37, 139; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a).
125. Note, supra note 103, at 136-37; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
126. Note, supra note 103, at 137.
127. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
128. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
129. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 540. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (stating that the ommission
of scienter from section 2251(a) of the PCASEA was deliberate).
131. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543.
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A. Facts
James Martin Souter, Jr. hired 16-year-old Traci Lords to appear
in a film, Those Young Girls, to be produced by Ronald Renee
Kantor and Rupert Sebastian McNee.12 The film depicted Lords
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 133 The government charged
Souter, Kantor, and McNee with producing material depicting a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of section
2251(a).1 4 The government did not claim that the material produced
by the defendants was obscene, but that the defendants could be
convicted under section 2251(a) for producing a non-obscene film
that depicted a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 35
The defendant producers did not claim Lords was an adult, but
proposed to introduce evidence at trial that Lords misled them as to
her age. 116 First, they intended to present photographic and testi-
monial evidence that Lords appeared physically mature at the time
the film was produced, and that her demeanor, sophistication, and
sexual experience belied her minority. 13 7 Second, they proposed to
show that Lords and her agent used California photographic identi-
fication, other official documents, release forms, and statements of
others to misrepresent her age. 138 The defendants also proposed to
introduce evidence that Lords was widely understood to be an adult.
39
The government moved in limine to bar defendants from presenting
this evidence, contending that knowledge of the age of the minor
was not an element of the offense under section 2251(a).Y4 The
defendants, arguing that the statute violated the first amendment and
132. Id. at 536.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 535. Souter pleaded guilty to this offense. His sentencing has been continued,
and he may withdraw his plea and stand trial if defendants in this case prevail. Id. at 536
n.1.
135. Id. at 536.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 540.
138. Id.
139. Id. This evidence included: (1) her prior appearances in the men's magazines Penthouse
and Cavalier which, according to industry custom and perception, reliably investigate the age
of their models; (2) her prior and subsequent appearances in other X-rated films; (3) nationwide
distribution, with apparent impunity, of materials depicting her in sexually explicit acts; and
(4) the fact that no one learned or suggested that she was a minor until two years after Those
Young Girls, the film produced by the defendants. Id.
140. Id. at 536. The government argued that because knowledge of the minor's age is not
an element of the offense, good-faith mistake could not be a defense. Id.
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due process if scienter was not a part of the government's prima
facie case, moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to specify
knowledge of the age of the minor as an element of the statute.' 4'
The district court denied both motions and ruled that the defendants
could present evidence that Lords misled them as to her age. 42 The
government petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ
of mandamus. 43
B. The Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the writ of mandamus, 44
directing the district court to allow defendants to present evidence
of reasonable mistake of age. 145 The Court of Appeals directed the
141. Id.
142. Id. The court held that the government was not required by the statute, due process,
or the first amendment to prove the defendants knew Lords was a minor. Id. The court stated
that strict liability for criminal offenses is justified only where: (1) The legislature grants the
privilege to engage in the activity; (2) the deterrent effect of a severe penalty is necessary to
prevent harm to the public interest; and (3) basic notions of fairness are not upset by criminal
conviction. Id. Finding that all three factors cut in favor of allowing a reasonable mistake of
age defense, the court allowed the defendants to present their evidence. Id.
143. Id. The defendant's trial was stayed pending disposition of the government's petition.
Id. In opposition to the government's petition, the defendants argued that the statute should
be interpreted to require scienter as to age as an element of the offense or to allow defendants
to prove reasonable mistake of fact as an affirmative defense. Id.
144. In issuing the writ of mandamus, the court noted that mandamus is extraordinary
relief and that five factors have been identified to guide the exercise of the mandamus power.
Id. at 536-37. See Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)
(listing the five factors). The court based the issuance of the writ on several factors. Kantor,
858 F.2d at 537. The court first found that an order allowing admission of evidence is not
subject to interlocutory appeal. Id. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West Supp. 1989); United States
v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the government has the right to
appeal only the suppression or exclusion of evidence, but not its admission). Secondly, the
court found that it is unlikely that an error will be correctable by any other means since the
government will be barred by the double jeopardy clause from raising the issue on appeal if
the defendants are acquitted, and will be barred by not being prejudiced by the error if the
defendants are convicted. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 537. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S.
54, 68-69 (1978) (holding that a judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars appellate
review of the error of the trial court); United States v. United States Dist. Court (De Lorean),
717 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing appellate review since, if the ruling of the trial
court stands, the ruling will have an adverse affect on criminal proceedings without opportunity
to review the ruling). Finally, the court found that the district court's order clearly raises a
new and important issue of first impression. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 537.
145. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543. Although the district court had allowed defendants to present
evidence of their reasonable mistake of age, it did not base the right to such a defense in the
first amendment or indicate the scope of such a defense. Id. The Court of Appeals found
that a defense based on common law notions of public policy may be broader than one
reflecting a constitutional minimum. Id.
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district court to advise the jury that the defendants may avoid
conviction only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence' 46 that
they did not know and could not reasonably have learned that the
actress was a minor.147 First, the court discussed whether scienter as
to age is an element of section 2251(a). 141 Second, the court considered
the alternative argument, asserted by the defendants, that the first
amendment requires a reasonable mistake of age defense.149 Finally,
the court discussed whether it had the authority to engraft a reason-
able mistake of age defense onto section 2251(a), which does not
expressly provide for a reasonable mistake of age defense.'5 0
1. Scienter As To Age
The court observed that section 2251(a), on its face, does not
require that the defendant know the age of the actress.' On its face,
section 2251(a) requires only that a defendant arrange for a minor
to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating a
visual depiction, and that there be a nexus with interstate com-
merce. 52 Further, the court found that the omission of scienter as
to age was clearly deliberate. 5 3 Therefore, the court held that knowl-
edge of the age of the minor is not required for conviction under
section 2251(a). 's4
146. The court stated that a defendant being convicted under section 2251(a), who presents
a reasonable mistake of age defense, alleges fraud on the part of the minor. Id. at 543 n.5.
Clear and convincing evidence is the normal standard to establish fraud in civil cases. Id. See
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (stating that the clear and convincing evidence
standard is used in civil cases involving allegations of fraud); Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 n.18 (1966) (stating that the clear and convincing
evidence standard has traditionally been imposed in cases of civil fraud). Although it is unusual
to require a criminal defendant to prove an affirmative defense by clear and convincing
evidence, the court found that the compelling government interest in enforcing section 2251(a)
requires that the reasonable mistake of age defense be as narrow as possible without sacrificing
the first amendment values it is designed to protect. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543 n.5.
147. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543-44.
148. Id. at 537-38.
149. Id. at 538-43.
150. Id. at 542-43.
151. Id. at 537-38.
152. Id. at 537.
153. Id. The court found that both Houses of Congress had originally considered a bill
making it unlawful for a person "knowingly" to employ, entice or coerce a minor to engage
in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual medium. Id.
154. Id. at 538.
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2. Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense Required by First
Amendment
The court turned to the contention, raised by the defendants, that
the free speech and press clause of the first amendment requires a
reasonable mistake of age defense.' 5 The court, citing Ferber, noted
that section 2251(a) regulates speech not protected by the first amend-
ment. 56 The court explained that the age of the actress, not whether
the film is obscene, was the factor which placed the film, Those
Young Girls, in the constitutionally unprotected speech category. 17
Therefore, the court examined whether the defendants could be
subjected to strict, criminal liability for misjudging the precise age
of the actress, when age is the determining factor between speech
that is protected and speech that is not protected.5 8 In analyzing this
issue, the court, relying on Smith v. California, concluded that strict
liability cannot be imposed when it has the collateral effect of
inhibiting free speech. 5 9
As in Smith, the statute in Kantor, section 2251(a), does not
require any type of scienter and regulates speech. 6° Applying the
Smith principles, the Kantor court considered whether imposition of
strict liability under section 2251(a) would seriously chill protected
speech.' 6' The court stated that the producers and distributers of
adult films cannot be absolutely sure of the age of a youthful-looking
actress. 62 Yet, section 2251(a) would subject the producer and dis-
tributer to serious criminal sanctions regardless of the impossibility
of knowing the age of the actress. 6 The court found that a producer
or distributor faced with criminal sanctions and the impossibility of
knowing the age of the actress will almost certainly be deterred from
producing materials depicting youthful-looking adult actresses to
avoid the possibility of criminal sanctions. 164 In addition, the court
155. Id.
156. Id. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
157. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 538-39.
158. Id. at 539.
159. Id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)). Strict liability may inhibit
free speech by making an individual more reluctant to exercise his right to speak freely. Id.
160. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (Vest Supp. 1989).
161. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 539-41.
162. Id. at 540.
163. Id. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(d) (West Supp. 1989) (first offense shall be fined not
more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years).
164. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540.
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found that youthful-looking actresses may be denied the opportunity
to participate in adult films and, therefore, audiences will be denied
the opportunity to view adult films depicting youthful-looking ac-
tresses. 165 The court concluded that strict liability for the age of the
actress would chill protected speech. ' "Consequently, the court stated
that the first amendment requires a reasonable mistake of age de-
fense. 167
3. Authority To Engraft A Defense Onto The Statute
Finally, the court considered whether it had the authority to engraft
a reasonable mistake of age defense onto a statute that does not
provide for the defense. 16 8 The court stated that, although evidence
indicates that Congress considered and rejected scienter as an element
of section 2251(a), there is no evidence that Congress considered and
rejected a reasonable mistake of age defense. 169 To support its con-
clusion, the court recognized that the federal courts may, in limited
circumstances, recognize an affirmative defense where a statute does
not expressly provide for it.170 One affirmative defense that has been
engrafted is entrapment, based on the reasoning that, in the absence
of indications to the contrary, courts will presume that Congress
intended exceptions to the language of a statute to avoid injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence.' 7' The court concluded that
if the presumption that Congress intended exceptions to the language
of a statute when necessary justifies the entrapment defense, then
the court could engraft a narrow mistake of age defense onto section
165. Id.
166. Id. at 541.
167. Id. at 542. In Kantor, the government also argued that inhibiting the production of
child pornography should not be a great concern of the court since child pornography does
not enjoy as much first amendment protection as other types of speech. Id. at 541 (citing
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (stating that society's
interest in protecting erotic materials is of a lesser magnitude than the interest in political
debate)). The court in Kantor, noted that a majority of the United States Supreme Court has
never adopted the view that child pornography is afforded a lesser degree of first amendment
protection than other forms of expression. Kantor, 858 F.2d 541-42. Therefore, the Kantor
court held that the first amendment protects child pornography as fully as political, literary
and scientific expression and debate. Kantor, 858 F.2d 542.
168. Id. at 542-43.
169. Id. at 542.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447 (1932)). See also Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (stating Congress could not have intended that its statutes
were to be enforced without allowing the assertion of the entrapment defense).
1363
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
2251(a) to avoid constitutional infirmity.172 The court assumed that
Congress would prefer section 2251(a), with a reasonable mistake of
age defense, to no statute at all.1
73
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Beezer dissented, stating that the interest of the government
in protecting minors from sexual exploitation must be weighed against
the possibility of inhibiting constitutionally protected speech when
testing a statute for overbreadth. 174 In assessing the interest of the
government, the dissent considered that in enacting the Child Pro-
tection Act, Congress found that child pornography exploited large
numbers of runaway and homeless children, harming the physiolog-
ical, emotional, and mental health of the children. 75 Judge Beezer
concluded that Congress intended to protect children like Traci Lords,
who tried to pass as an adult to appear in pornography. 76 As in
Ferber, the Kantor dissent found that the prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children is a government objective of
surpassing concern. 177
In assessing the possibility of inhibiting constitutionally protected
speech, Judge Beezer relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ferber which held that laws against child pornography violate the
first amendment only if they pose a substantial threat of chilling
protected speech.178 In discussing whether section 2251(a) was sub-
172. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 542.
173. Id. The court stated that this defense would be implausible under most circumstances
and therefore, allowing such a defense would not seriously disrupt the effective operation of
section 2251(a) or hamper the effort to protect minors from sexual abuse. Id. See generally
supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the striking down of, or limiting
-construction placed upon, an overly broad statute).
174. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 544.
175. Id. (citing the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-292 § 2, 98 Stat. 204).
176. Id. at 544. Section 2251(a) is the strongest protection for such children by placing the
burden on producers of pornography to establish that their actors are not minors. Id.
177. Id. at 544-45 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982)).
178. Id. at 545. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982). As opposed to the
majority opinion, Judge Beezer stated that Smith and Ferber do not compel a reasonable
mistake of age defense. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 547. The dissent, in distinguishing Smith from
the present case, stated that in Smith the issue was knowledge of the nature of the material.
Id. The Ferber Court suggested that criminal liability for child pornography similarly requires
knowledge of the nature of the material. Id. However, the dissent in Kantor stated that the
present case is distinguishable from Smith and Ferber because the present case focuses on
knowledge that a minor is employed. Id. Flowing from this basic distinction, the dissent found
the present case distinguishable from Smith based on the following factors: (1) The pornography
ordinance in Smith was not required to be substantially overbroad while the child pornography
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stantially overbroad, the dissent stated that the expression threatened
in this case consisted of pornography depicting youthful-looking
adults. 179 The dissent, in analyzing the potential chilling effect of
section 2251(a), looked at the profit motive of the pornography
producers and the producer's access to original documents establish-
ing the true age of the actor.180 Judge Beezer first stated that most
prosecutions involve actors who are unmistakably children: prose-
cutions for hiring minors who are not unmistakably minors are very
rare. 81 Based on findings that pornography is profitable, and high
demand creates a powerful incentive for producers to make pornog-
raphy featuring youthful-looking actors, the dissent concluded that
producers will not be inhibited by the slim chance of prosecution.1
82
Furthermore, Judge Beezer stated that a pornography producer has
access to original documents which establish the age of the actor.
18 3
The dissent stated that a pornographer can immunize himself from
prosecution under section 2251(a) by completing an accurate inves-
tigation of the actor's age.18 Based on the finding that any chilling
effect would be mitigated by the producer's economic motive and
that a producer may be insulated from liability by making an
investigation into original documents establishing the actor's age,
statute in the present case is required to be substantially overbroad; (2) liability in Smith
hinged on whether the material was obscene, a difficult element to define, while liability in
the present case rests on the age of the actor, a readily ascertainable fact; and (3) the defendant
in Smith was a distributor, who is not in a position to know the nature of the material, while
the defendant in the present case is a producer, who is in a position to establish the age of
the actor. Id.
179. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 546.
180. Id.
181. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. NEws 492, 494 (stating that prosecutions are most often based
solely on the pornographic material itself, since the children cannot be located, and therefore
the prosecution must show that the child is a minor based solely on the pictures).
182. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 546. See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Awinn. NEws 40, 43 (stating that child pornography
involves "vast potential profits").
183. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 546. Judge Beezer stated that even if documents did not exist
the pornographer would still be safe. Id. Since the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the actor was a minor, the absence of original documents would raise a reasonable
doubt. Id. Therefore, the producer could not be convicted under section 2251(a) when original
documents are absent. Id.
184. Id. Judge Beezer rejects the notion that a pornographer can never be sure the actor
is not a minor. Id. Original documents can be relied upon and a court should not accept an
argument that a person cannot always rely on original documents. Id. See Trident Center v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticizing an approach calling for
skepticism about a party's ability to know the meaning of words in a contract when the
contract's language was unambiguous).
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Judge Beezer thought that section 2251(a) does not pose a substantial
threat of chilling protected speech.185 Therefore, the dissent found
that a reasonable mistake of age defense to section 2251(a) is not
required by the first amendment. 18 6
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Overbreadth Doctrine Refined
The decision in Kantor may indicate a need for further refinement
of the substantial overbreadth doctrine. 87 In Kantor, both the ma-
jority and dissent required substantial overbreadth to invalidate the
statute as unconstitutional. 88 However, the majority found that the
statute was overbroad while the dissent found that the statute was
not overbroad.' 9
The disparity between the decision of the majority and the decision
of the dissent indicates that the majority and dissent considered
different factors in analyzing whether section 2251(a) inhibited ex-
pression protected by the first amendment.9 In analyzing whether
section 2251(a) inhibited expression protected by the first amendment,
the majority emphasized that a producer has no way of being sure
that a youthful-looking actor or actress is not a minor. 191 Conversly,
185. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 547.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
188. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540 (majority stating that "the first amendment does not permit
the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability where doing so would
seriously chill protected speech"); id. at 545 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (stating that "laws against
child pornography violate the first amendment only when they pose a substantial threat of
chilling protected expression").
189. See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text (majority's analysis of the statute's
overbreadth); supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text (dissent's analysis of the statute's
overbreadth).
190. See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text (majority's analysis of the statute's
overbreadth); supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text (dissent's analysis of the statute's
overbreadth).
191. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540. The majority concluded that producers will almost certainly
be deterred from producing pornography depicting youthful-looking adult actors when faced
with possible criminal liability and no way of being sure that a youthful-looking actor or
actress is not a minor. Id. Cf. United States v. Sherin, No. 86-CR-480, slip op. at 22 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 1987) (construing knowingly under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 to require proof of scienter
because distributors facing strict liability would almost certainly censor films depicting adults).
But cf. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543-44 n.6 (majority stating that requiring the pornography
producer to learn the age of the actor or actress will not chill the distribution of books and
films because the producer is in a position to know or learn the age of their employees).
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the dissent, in analyzing whether section 2251(a) inhibited expression
protected by the first amendment, considered the number of prose-
cutions under section 2251(a) which involved an actor or actress who
was not unmistakably a minor, the producer's profit motive in
producing pornography depicting youthful-looking subjects and the
producer's ability to establish the age of the actor or actress. 192
The difference in the factors that the majority and dissent discuss
indicates a need for a decision as to what factors should be considered
in an overbreadth analysis and how these factors should be weighed.
The overbreadth doctrine requires that there be a realistic danger
that the statute will significantly compromise the exercise of protected
speech in a substantial number of instances.193 For a court to conclude
that there is a realistic danger of inhibiting protected speech, the
court should look at the defendant's motivations for engaging in the
protected conduct and the steps available to the defendant to insulate
himself from possible criminal liability. 194 In addition, the court
should consider the number of instances the statute may actually
inhibit the exercise of protected speech.
95
B. Successful Application of Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense
Under Section 2251(a)
The Kantor decision fails to define the standard for applying a
reasonable mistake of age defense. 9 6 The court in Kantor required
a producer raising a reasonable mistake of age defense to prove by
192. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 546-47. Based on a finding that prosecutions under section 2251(a)
involving an actor or actress who is not unmistakably a minor are rare, that a profit-minded
producer will not be inhibited by the slim chance of prosecution, and that a producer may
insulate himself from criminal liability by consulting original documents to establish the age
of the actor or actress; the dissent found that section 2251(a) did not pose a substantial threat
of chilling protected speech. Id. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
dissent's analysis of the potential chilling effect of section 2251(a) through the analysis of the
number of prosecutions in which the actor or actress is not unmistakably a minor, the
pornography producer's profit motive, and the pornography producer's access to original
documents which establish the age of the actor or actress).
193. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
194. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text (dissent's discussion of the realistic
danger that section 2251(a) will significantly chill protected speech).
195. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234
(1988) (finding the New York law not substantially overbroad because the defendant did not
demonstrate from the text of the law and from actual fact that a substantial number of
instances exist in which the law could not be applied constitutionally).
196. See generally United States v. United States Dist. Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 534, 542-
543 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing situations in which the defense may be raised and the fact that
a successful defense will be exceedingly rare).
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clear and convincing evidence that he did not know and could not
reasonably have learned that the actor or actress was under eighteen
years of age. 197 Although Kantor did not enunciate the minimum
evidence that would be sufficient to meet the clear and convincing
burden of proof, the decision did intimate what factors a court
should consider in its analysis. 19 Those factors are as follows: (1)
Evidence that the actor appeared physically and sexually mature; (2)
forged documentation, presented to the producer by the actor, mis-
representing the age of the actor; (3) evidence that the actor is widely
known in the pornography industry as an adult; and (4) evidence
that the producer obtained a copy of the actor's birth certificate
from the birthplace of the actor.' 99 By applying these factors, courts
will ensure that children will be protected from sexual exploitation
by limiting a successful reasonable mistake of age defense to those
cases in which the minor has actively misrepresented his age to the
pornography producer and the pornography producer has taken all
reasonable investigatory steps to ensure the actor or actress is not a
minor.2w At the same time, defining these factors minimizes the
potential that the pornography producer's protected speech will be
inhibited because the pornographer will know what steps to take to
insulate himself from possible criminal liability under section 2251(a).2 )1
This minimizes the danger of chilling protected speech. Because
defining the factors will minimize the danger of chilling protected
speech, section 2251(a) does not violate the overbreadth doctrine.
197. Id. at 543.
198. In fact, the court indicated that the facts involved in Kantor might be sufficient to
produce a successful reasonable mistake of age defense, but noted that a case like this is very
rare and even in those rare cases the jury may be skeptical and choose to convict. Id. The
court stated that a defendant would have a difficult time meeting the clear and convincing
burden of proof even when an older teenager is involved. Id. at 542-43.
199. See generally id. at 542-43 (stating that the reasonable mistake of age defense would
be implausible in cases involving children or prepubescent teenagers, or in cases where the
pornographer did not act with appropriate prudence in ensuring that the actor was not a
minor); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2257(a)-(b) (requiring the pornography producer to examine identifi-
cation documents to ascertain the age of the actor).
200. See Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543 n.5 (stating that a section 2251(a) defendant who presents
a reasonable mistake of age defense is alleging fraud on the part of the minor actor or actress).
201. Because a reasonable mistake of age defense is available and the steps required to be
taken by the pornography producer are clearly established, the pornography producer will not
refrain from exercising protected speech because of fear of criminal sanctions by a statute
susceptible of application to the protected speech. See Kantor, 858 F.2d at 543-44 n.6 (stating
that requiring pornography producers to learn the ages of the actors will not chill the
distribution of books and films since producers are in a position to learn the age of their
employees).
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C. Congressional Action
The decision in Kantor may also prompt Congressional action.
Congress may amend the Child Protection Act (CPA) to add a
provision explicitly providing for a reasonable mistake of age defense.
However, if Congress does so, profit motive may encourage pornog-
raphers to help minors create forged documentation that represents
the age of the minor as over eighteen.20 2 In addition, profit motive
may encourage pornographers to refrain from investigating original
documentation of the age of the actor or actress. 203 The underlying
purpose of the CPA is to protect children from sexual exploitation
by forbidding the use of children as the subjects of pornography.
Therefore, amending section 2251(a) of the CPA to allow for a
reasonable mistake of age defense will not further the underlying
purpose of the CPA since the amendment will not prevent minors
from being used as the subject of pornography. Accordingly, Con-
gress should not provide the defense.
Instead, Congress should amend section 2251(a) to expressly ex-
clude a reasonable mistake of age defense to promote the underlying
purpose of the CPA. Doing so would not be in violation of the first
amendment and would promote the important governmental interest
of protecting children from sexual exploitation. Section 2251(a) is
not substantially overbroad for principally four reasons. 4 First, there
202. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 540 n.2 (stating that document forgery is big
business); Kantor, 858 F.2d at 546 (stating that pornography is lucrative, there is a high
demand for pornography featuring youthful-looking subjects, and that pornographers will act
on their profit motive to supply this demand); S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADnu. NEws 40, 43 (stating that child
pornography involves great profit potential).
203. See Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540 n.2 (stating that the pornographer could obtain a certified
copy of the actor's birth certificate only where the pornographer knows the actor's real name,
which is unlikely when the actor is using forged documents); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2257(a)-(b)
(requiring producers of sexually explicit material to investigate into the actual age of the actors
and to keep records containing the age, name and address of the actors). Contra id. at 546
(Beezer, J., dissenting) (stating that it would be simple for a pornographer to obtain a certified
copy of the actor's birth certificate). Cf. id. at 543-44 n.6 (stating that the producer is in a
position to know or learn the age of the actor).
204. See generally New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct.
2225, 2234 (1988) (finding the New York law not substantially overbroad because the defendant
did not demonstrate from the text of the law and from actual fact that a substantial number
of instances exist in which the law could not be applied constitutionally); supra notes 27-31
and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of substantial overbreadth); supra notes
178-86 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's analysis of the potential chilling effect
of section 2251(a)).
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are very few prosecutions under section 2251(a) which involve an
actor or actress who is not unmistakably a minor °.2 0  Second, the
protected speech of a profit-minded producer will probably not be
inhibited by the slim chance of prosecutions.206 Third, a producer
may insulate himself from criminal liability by consulting original
documentation of the age of the actor or actress.207 Finally, there is
a great governmental interest in protecting minors from sexual ex-
ploitation. 28 Because section 2251(a) is not substantially overbroad
within the context of the first amendment, a reasonable mistake of
age defense is not required to rescue section 2251(a) from constitu-
tional infirmity.2 9 Therefore, Congress may amend section 2251(a)
to expressly exclude a reasonable mistake of age defense to protect
children from sexual exploitation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kantor, held that a
reasonable mistake of age defense must be available to those accused
of violating section 2251(a) of the Child Protection Act. 210 The court
found that section 2251(a), on its face, did not require that the
defendant know the age of the actress, and that Congress deliberately
omitted scienter as to age.211 The court held that section 2251(a),
without a scienter requirement, would chill protected speech.212 There-
fore, in order to save section 2251(a), the court held that a reasonable
mistake of age defense must be available. 213
There are several possible ramifications of the decision in Kantor.
First, the Kantor decision may indicate a need for further refinement
of the overbreadth doctrine.2 4 Second, the decision leaves undecided




209. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Kantor dissent's analysis
of the overbreadth of section 2251(a). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982)
(stating that criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some degree of scienter on
the part of the defendant); supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Kantor
majority's analysis of the overbreadth of section 2251(a).
210. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 542.
211. Id. at 538.
212. Id. at 540-41.
213. Id. at 543.
214. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (discussing the possible refinement of
the overbreadth doctrine).
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what evidence is sufficient to succeed in raising a reasonable mistake
of age defense. 21 5 Third, Congress may react to Kantor by amending
the Child Protection Act to provide for a reasonable mistake of age
defense, or expressly refuse to amend the Child Protection Act to
provide for such a defense. 21 6
Janelle E. Pretzer
1371
215. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing what evidence may be
sufficient to succeed in raising a reasonable mistake of age defense).
216. See supra notes 202-209 and accompanying text (discussing the possible reactions of
Congress).

